don sobre loscambios: Topics by avesisland.info
Ya quedamos libres de la inmanencia y de la trascendencia. Drever, John ( ), «Topophonophilia: a study on the relationship between the por la esencialización de ésta, que el exogrupo (el «negro con plato») se instituye como tal. For example, picture 1 below illustrates the concrete relationship Cat sits on Mat, Greek philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, understood that. Schmitz' formulations deny not only platonic dualism, which divided the human . A period-luminosity relation for Mira variables in globular clusters and its Figuras conceptuales como devenir, inmanencia y acontecimiento son la base de analiza la incidencia y trascendencia de Acción Cultural Popular (ACPO en la.
After the Philosophical Investigations was published, she presided over a group to discuss it at her house. Assuming that the discussion group would be cancelled, I went round the next day with a bottle of wine for a celebration. I found Elizabeth in a dressing-gown and the discussion in full swing; she merely glanced at me, remarking that I was late. Her stock of philosophical acquaintances was quite international, and it may be that she found the intellectual atmosphere of a single university overly narrow.
Austin and his followers. Perhaps the doctrines of that school which aroused most resistance from Anscombe were those relating to sense-perception. She clearly felt that Austin and others had trivialized the discussion of this issue, or possibly just changed the subject.
In this connection, it is worth quoting her description of the lectures of H. Price, to which she went as an undergraduate, before Austin had really hit the scene: I went to H. I found them intensely interesting. Indeed, of all the people I heard at Oxford, he was the one who excited my respect; the one I found worth listening to. This was not because I agreed with him, indeed I used to sit tearing my gown into little strips because I wanted to argue against so much that he said. But even so, what he said seemed to me to be absolutely about the stuff.
Introduction 7 Anscombe and Dummett shared more than a dislike of ordinary language philosophy. They both had a great admiration for the work of Frege, at a time when this was not very common. That Anscombe should have chosen the Tractatus as the theme for one of her books is another indication of how her philosophical interests were immune to fashion. And it would have seemed the most natural thing for Anscombe to have written about the latter book, which after all she had translated into English.
It may be that she felt that the Investigations was receiving enough attention already, and that philosophers were in danger of forgetting about the Tractatus; but she also clearly believed that there was much of value in the earlier book, even if some of its main ideas turned out to be philosophical dead ends.
Wrongness of exegesis, especially when exegesis is disclaimed, is not so grave a charge—even if Kripke somewhat belies the disclaimers. What Kripke claims—namely that there is a serious sceptical argument—that is what is interesting and it is one thing we should be grateful to him for.
Moreover, the interest of his argument was independent of whether its conclusion was true; the point was that it opened up deep and important questions. She was a Fellow of New Hall. My own acquaintance with Anscombe dates from not long after her arrival in Cambridge, when I was still a child; my mother also at New Hall had been taught by Anscombe as a graduate student in Oxford, and maintained the friendship in Cambridge.
prestizhni fotokonkurs mira: Topics by avesisland.info
It was a kind of lecturing which would now be discouraged, if not forbidden, as having a value impossible to measure using common or garden yardsticks. Anscombe retired in She had earlier suffered severe concussion as a result of falling off a horse, and about ten years later had to undergo emergency brain surgery after the car she was being driven in crashed into an oncoming vehicle driving on the wrong side of the road.
These accidents, and her imperfect health, clouded her last years; but she continued philosophical work as long as she was able, and was sustained by the love of family and friends. She died inand was buried in a grave next to that of Wittgenstein.
The corpus of writings by Elizabeth Anscombe is very large and covers a wide variety of topics. A bibliography of her works may be found at the end of this book.
Then there are the numerous articles, many but by no means all of which are to be found in the three volumes of her Collected Papers. The recently published Human Life, Action and Ethics ed. Gormally contains further essays; and other collections are due to appear. Most of her best-known writings are discussed, but so are several lesser-known pieces.
Finally, my thanks to Peter Momtchiloff at Oxford University Press for his encouragement and help, and to Bonnie Blackburn for copy-editing the manuscript and compiling the bibliography. Such is the case with Elizabeth Anscombe and intention. Anscombe is one of the most versatile of philosophers, and one aspect of this versatility is her capacity to see multiple philosophical strands. Intention is a topic bristling with such strands. The strands are both picked apart and woven together. These different aspects of the topic are interconnected: There are plenty of writings on intention that exemplify this sort of limitation.
What is remarkable is that she should have managed to do this in a work of a mere ninety-four pages. Not that Intention is the last word on the subject—there could be no last word, I suppose, in particular because of those very pathways into other domains that I have noted.
But its combination of brevity and richness may well explain both why Intention is recognized as the seminal work that it is, and why its lessons are still under-appreciated and often misunderstood.
Anscombe introduces her subject under three heads: A Expression of intention for the future e. Truman had ordered the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; under what descriptions were his actions intentional? Intentional Action 11 The structure of the book essentially corresponds to these themes in this order. The point is that her approach to the phenomena is unencumbered. I will, however, begin with B rather than with A.
The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe
As Anscombe saw, there is no compulsory entry point for this subject. Separately Describable Sensations Anscombe begins her discussion of intentional action with an extremely simple and effective move. That is to remind us of how we can very often say straight off what someone is doing, when we are observing that person: I8 This phenomenon displays several key features: We shall have more to say about this in the next chapter.
But we must be careful here: The harmony between word and deed is not guaranteed in each particular case, but it must hold generally, or at any rate in enough cases. If people too often said bizarre things about what they were up to e.
The account given by the person himself and the account given by other people hold one another in check, as it were. Others can say what someone is doing by observing him.
One can know straight off that one has hiccupped, for example. Strictly speaking, the phrase applies to the peristaltic movement of the gut: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Blackwell,paras. Intentional Action 13 background knowledge—knowledge acquired at school, from books, etc. This latter knowledge appears to be based on observation, of teachers, books, or what have you. So we could for present purposes lump together a things known through observation of them, and b things known through observation of other things e.
We still need to say something about what observation is. A natural explanation of observation is: If I know I am developing a mole on my arm, then it will typically be because I have looked at it and seen it; and this seems a paradigm case of observation-based knowledge. So non-observational knowledge would, for our purposes, be knowledge of X that is neither acquired through looking etc. It is without observation, because nothing shews him the position of his limbs; it is not as if he were going by a tingle in his knee, which is the sign that it is bent and not straight.
Where we can speak of separately describable sensations, having which is in some sense our criterion for saying something, then we can speak of observing that thing; but that is not generally so when we know the position of our limbs. I13 What is it for a sensation to be separately describable? Anscombe gives the following illustration: I15 Now it cannot be that Anscombe is simply pointing out that e. The point seems rather to be this.
What is the point of explaining what observation is in terms of separately describable sensations? How is such an explanation to be preferred to one that simply alludes to looking, listening, feeling, and the like? The answer to these questions emerges when we turn to our main topic—intentional action. If we want to apply the conception of observation as looking etc. For example, when I know that I am writing a letter, is my knowledge based on my looking, or feeling, or whatever—or is it not so based?
Well, when I write a letter, I certainly do look at the paper, my pen, etc. The ink might run out without my knowing it—or my handwriting become illegible. And a decrease in certainty surely amounts, eventually, to a loss of knowledge. We shall see in Ch. The evidence from what people ordinarily say does not, ex hypothesi, support that claim. So it seems that another criterion must be operating which might support the claim—criterion apresumably. This can be seen from such a case as that of building a wall.
Until the wall is built, it would not be right to say that you can see that you are building a wall, as opposed to digging a trench for example. Criterion athen, cannot be adequate as a criterion of observation-based practical knowledge, since according to it you know you are writing because you can see that you are. And for Anscombe, describable appearances amount to describable sensations e. Anscombe can extend these considerations to cases of observation-based knowledge of the sort I described as paradigm—e.
So far, then, there seems to be a good case for explaining observation in terms of separately describable sensations, and for characterizing knowledge of what one is doing as not based upon observation.
She herself alludes to this fact in a footnote I I think these facts [about describable visual sensations, etc. At the same time, she is not recommending the reinstatement of sense-data, or anything like them. In what sense is the visual appearance separately describable, and not the sensation?
Anscombe might reply that one can, for instance, draw what one sees, imitate what one hears, and so on: When discussing perception, there is often a danger of concentrating too much upon sight. Human vision is such that we have fairly sophisticated ways of visually representing things, both where the representation is linguistic and where it is non-linguistic.
But observation can employ other sense modalities than sight. Knowledge through smelling is observation-based knowledge; but i it is unclear what a non-linguistic representation of an olfactory appearance could be, and ii our vocabulary for smells is thoroughly bound up with the concepts of things smelt roses, burning, dampness, etc.
So olfactory sensations seem to be in the same boat as sensations of posture and movement, when it Intentional Action 17 comes to not being separately describable—awkwardly for Anscombe. And as for vision, there are limits on how far our descriptions of things seen can go without mentioning objects.
Colours, shapes, and the like are not always so easily invoked, and the only or best way of describing a visual appearance may well be as the appearance of a certain kind of object, on occasion.
The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe - PDF Free Download
Oxford University Press,92— But we might still say that they are grounded, in the sense of having had grounds, e. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, e. Intention is unlike emotion in this respect, that the expression of it is purely conventional [. I5 What really shows that the concepts of truth and of knowledge have application to X is that there is such a thing as intelligible error about X.
But, as we shall see, Anscombe thought that an expression of intention could be straightforwardly false, though perfectly sincere—sincere falsehood making for error, or what we might as well call error in this context.
This kinship shows in two ways: This is not because the place of pain the feeling, not the damage has to be accepted by someone I tell it to; for we can imagine circumstances in which it is not accepted.
Whereas if someone says that his leg is bent when it is straight, this may be surprising but is not particularly obscure. He is wrong in what he says, but not unintelligible.
I14 Anscombe is here in agreement with Wittgenstein, that knowledge presupposes or involves the possibility of intelligible doubt or error in clear contrast to the Cartesian view of knowledge as ruling out the possibility of doubt or error.
When it comes to intentional action, by contrast, there is room for intelligible error. Does the same apply to expressions of intention? You know what you are doing, and you know the positions of your limbs; but you can say —you do not know—where your pains are.
The effect of a mental cause can be an involuntary action, thought, or feeling, but it can also be a voluntary action: The question I wish to raise is: Consequently, if we are to call it knowledge of causation at all, and if we are to follow Anscombe in her account of non-observational knowledge, then we must invoke separately describable sensations, or rather the lack of them.
As with posture, etc. Are we to say that this kind of perceptual knowledge is based on observation? It is not based on or derived from sense-data, but then neither is perceptual knowledge of objects and events. If we follow Anscombe, the question we shall need to ask is whether there are any separately describable sensations of causation—i. Well, you can on the face of it depict non-linguistically a man cutting a loaf of bread, just as you can depict the loaf of bread itself; and if the latter amounts to depicting an appearance, why not the former?
But let us say that Hume is labouring with a wrong model of perception, so that we can in fact speak of separately describable sensations in connection with seeing a loaf being cut. Try to depict this in imagination? We therefore propose a new notion of landscape which combines both the cultural and naturalist approaches, and as a result we introduce the idea of processual landscape to explain both the health-landscape and the medical agency-structure binomial pairs.
In introducing this new framework, we follow both a naturalistic and cultural methodology. Human beings live embedded in landscape and they perceive it through their whole body; it affects their well-being.
The common understanding of landscape today is still the cultural one, which maintains a delicate balance between aesthetics and cultural studies, history and art theory.
In this paper we provide a brief history of the concept of landscape from a visual, perceptional, and cultural point of view.
However, in order to bridge the gap between social and natural sciences in their approach to this concept, we take a step forward in the naturalization of landscape. In order to understand what landscape is and how it affects our health we have to address biological and ecological theories of perception of the environment.
Our hypothesis is that, thanks to ecological psychology and the consequent theory of affordance, it is possible to naturalize landscape by introducing ideas from the scientific domain into a body of literature that has, for decades, remained exclusively cultural. Human beings are an active part of the process of co-creating landscape, both from a cultural and an ecological point of view.
Their life, body and perception which here we ground in the theory of affordance cannot be detached from landscape. Their mental and physical health depends and relies on it. This agential dimension of the notion of processual landscape, we argue, provides the missing connection with health and well-being.
The paper is structured as follows: We then conclude with a recapitulation and some general remarks on the effectiveness of the framework proposed and its ethical implications. Main Theoretical Issues and Approaches Many papers in contemporary literature analyze data series related to how well-being could be effectively improved by exposure to natural landscapes see Coles and Millman, From architecture and the humanities to medicine and ecology, the evidence reported highlights the fact that well-being, health and natural landscape are correlated.
Below, we summarize some of the main approaches found in the literature: We have divided this section into two parts: These studies, based on stress reduction and attachment to place, were the first to illustrate the correlation between landscape and health during the and s.
In the second section, the analysis of the literature is focused on the concept of health, and how over recent decades health and well-being have been connected to landscape through medical evidence and studies on their social determinants.
By presenting these various theories, we acknowledge their pioneering role in the debate while at the same time pointing out that they lack a comprehensive theoretical framework. The aim of this paper is to provide a new, broader framework, which is both cultural and ecological.
Research Focused on Restorative Environments Psychology and philosophy stress the importance of the relationship between health and landscape in different ways. Psychology, for instance, addresses this issue through psycho-evolutionary frameworks and the so-called ART theory, all of which focus on stress reduction.
Philosophy, on the other hand, proposes a place-attachment approach which originates from phenomenology and human geography.
One of the most important theories of place-attachment is called topophilia, which has nowadays been expanded to include the concept of biophilia. All these theories demonstrate, from different points of view, the intimate connection between our body, our health and the landscape in which we live, or merely look at.
In these works, stress is usually defined as the process by which individuals respond psychologically, physiologically, and often behaviorally to situations that challenge or threaten their well-being Ulrich et al.
These theories played a pioneering role in the determination of health by natural settings, yet can be called into question from a theoretical point of view. Ulrich and Ulrich et al. According to this framework, the color green signifying, for example, refuge would be less stressful than red or yellow, which signify fire Ulrich et al.
The reason for this preference is directly related to the link between evolution and aesthetic response: The psycho-evolutionary theory has the merit of initiating the debate on the naturalization of landscape see Appleton, ; Dutton,; Di Summa-Knoop,yet it poses a number of problems.
Firstly, an evolution-based theory of stress reduction or landscape preference cannot be demonstrated. Secondly, it risks relying on ad hoc hypotheses to explain specific situations.
And finally, such a strategy for the naturalization of landscape often underestimates the role of cultural and sociological elements in addressing the health-landscape connection. Attention Restoration Theory Psychology The Experience of Nature Kaplan and Kaplan, examines the qualities that characterize restorative environments, that is to say, environments that help restore our attention.
Irritability, anxiety, stress, lack of perception, and lack of interest in human beings have all been recognized as a direct consequence of attention fatigue.
Kaplan and Kaplan developed ART Attention Restoration Theory on the basis that we can better concentrate and restore our directed attention after experiencing nature, since during that experience we are attracted by an involuntary attention or fascination Kaplan and Kaplan, ; Kaplan, ; Warber et al. Taking inspiration from Kaplan and Kaplanp. According to Kaplan and Kaplanpp. This psychological theory proposes a specific framework, focused on restoration of attention and the involuntary role of fascination in human mind.
It is one of the most interesting studies explaining the link between health and nature, even though it does not take explicitly into account the cultural aspect of perception. The majority of the research in environmental psychology follows either ART or stress reduction theory, or both of them Bratman et al. The main difference between the two relates to the fact that the former is more focused on cognition, the latter on evolutionary elements.
However, one of the most important contributions to this debate came from the field of human geography, when Tuandefined the concept of place-attachment in terms of topophilia, i. Topophilia from the ancient Greek topos: Tuan was one of the first geographers to provide an understanding of place as a product of perceptive and cultural elements: He also introduced the idea that anonymous space is changed into articulated geography through the actions and values of people.
His distinction between space and place and his genealogy of the concept of place have become very important for many geographers, philosophers, and sociologists, as well as for cultural approaches to place in general.LA CULTURA DE LA INMANENCIA.
His idea of topophilia has also been studied in connection with well-being, meaning that individual preferences for specific places and restorative environments are significantly associated with quality of life Ogunseitan, ; Ruan and Hogben, Several other concepts — which can be considered variations on the theme — such as sense of place, place-identity and place-attachment, were developed from the concept of topophilia, and analyzed through both experimental research and philosophical works Lewicka, Recently, the concept of topophilia has reemerged in relation to biophilia.
The concept has been justified in terms of place-attachment: The attempt at linking topophilia and biophilia Sampson, ; Beery et al. The role of the concept of topophilia and its variations has been widely recognized in the literature Lewicka, Its recent developments demonstrate also that there is a need to connect cultural approaches to place-attachment with naturalized ones.
Evidence of the Health-Landscape Relationship: Toward a New Definition of Health Over recent decades much evidence — mostly medical — of the health-landscape relationship has been provided. The main theory on which this evidence is based and toward which it leads is known as SDH theory. In this section we analyze the principal medical evidence reported, summarize SDH theory and attempt to provide a new definition of health, based on notions of both agency and landscape.
The SDH approach is quite interesting in that it defines a broader concept of health, yet we feel that the other part of the process, i. The idea of processual landscape aims to resolve this problem. The late s and the early years of the new millennium witnessed mounting evidence in support of the necessary relationship between health and well-being and landscape.
This evidence prompts us to question the concepts of care, health and place of care, as well as the role of the patient him or herself. In other words, it prompts us to question the relationship between medical structure and agency. The idea of therapeutic landscapes can apply to a wide variety of landscapes: The category encompasses national parks, local urban landscapes, gardens Milligan et al. Moreover, the idea of therapeutic landscape implies the improvement of the medical community, specifically in terms of the relationship between health structure and agency Gesler, Recently, the concept of therapeutic landscapes has been broadened to include some other symbolic terms referring to place-attachment.
However, despite its different meanings and applications, the notion of therapeutic landscapes allows us to question the idea that physical and mental health problems are merely personal issues which should be addressed solely through individual-based interventions Wood et al.
Many other studies also present ample medical evidence both direct and indirect of the health-landscape relationship. The broader climate change discussion includes an attempt to connect biodiversity and medicine: Thus, health practitioners and policymakers not only recognize the impact of place and physical and social environments on health and well-being Hordyk et al.
All this evidence led to the drafting of the UN document on Commission on Social Determinants of Health [CSDH] and World Conference on Social Determinants of Health and to the SDH approach Solar and Irwin,which can be considered both further evidence of the relationship between health and landscape and, better still, as the final result of a decades-long struggle.
SDH is the study of the full set of conditions under which living takes place, and their impact on health. Both the document and the consequent approach link health to a number of elements, including among others governance, environment, education, employment, social security, food, housing, water, transport, and energy.
Health is thus considered as being socially determined. However, in order to avoid falling into the trap of environmental determinism Blacksher and Lovasi,it is necessary to specify the role played by the concept of agency. The common-sense meaning of health refers to the biological realm and implies the absence of a pathological condition both physiological and psychological.
Yet contemporary definitions of health are focused on both the notion of agency e. From this perspective, a definition which integrates both agency and environment could be: In this case, health and the space of the agent are considered as inseparable concepts; accordingly, determinants of health can thus be divided into: In this scenario, the pitfall of environmental determinism is overcome by specifying and analyzing the culture and perceptional preferences of the agent Blacksher and Lovasi,p.
Although the concept of SDH may risk appearing somewhat vague and overly broad, the notion of landscape, on the other hand of which we offer both an ecological and cultural definitionis an appropriate and specific tool for describing the relationship between our body, our health, our well-being and the space around us. We can reformulate the structure-agency binomial pair into the landscape-perceiver one. We will explain the rich concept of landscape in the following section, before offering a definition of processual landscape which will finally be used to comprehend the notion of health and propose a theoretical framework to account for the health-landscape relationship.
The Cultural Approach and Beyond In this section of the paper we provide a comprehensive definition of landscape which connects both the cultural and ecological dimensions. We consider it one of the key factors for recognizing the role of landscape in determining well-being and health. When we talk about landscape several features are implied: The following paragraphs aim to explain and connect all these dimensions through the bridge concept of affordance.
We also demonstrate that landscape can be distinguished from other similar concepts such as space, place and territory, due to its perceptual implications and, in particular, its aesthetic and therapeutic qualities.
We live embedded in landscape and, as we add, we perceive it through our whole body, and therefore it affects our well-being. This is why we need a more comprehensive definition of landscape.