Jun 28, Same-sex marriage is advancing while affirmative action is receding because that's what the But why would the Court respond to public opinion? Indeed, politicians may benefit from challenging Court decisions that are. Rather than explore the relationship between the public and the Court on a to which Court decisions affect (or “move”) public opinion But. 3. The debate. the reciprocal relationships between the Supreme Court and public opinion. of the Supreme Court and how the Court's decisions influence public opinion.
We ask respondents how they would have voted on a set of cases recently decided by the Court, meaning that we can generate a comparable set of ideal points for both masses and elites in a common space.
We find that the Court is generally representative of mass opinion and that most citizens have accurate perceptions of the Court.
However, we also find that people are substantially more likely to misperceive the Court as being too liberal than too conservative. Journal of Politics, August Given this fact, judicial scholars have paid substantial attention to the swing justice. First, we show that in a substantial number of cases, the justice that casts the pivotal vote is not the median justice on the Court.
Second, we argue that the swing justice will typically rely less on attitudinal considerations and more on strategic and legal considerations than the other justices on the Court. The theory and findings suggest that a failure to consider the unique behavior of a pivotal actor—whether on the Supreme Court or any other decision-making body—can lead to incorrect conclusions about the determinants of policy outputs.
Most work is based on the assumption that the contemporary Court is objectively conservative in its policymaking, meaning that ideological disagreement should come from liberals and agreement from conservatives.
The Supreme Court, public opinion and decision-making: Research roundup - Journalist's Resource
Analysis of a national survey shows that subjective ideological disagreement exhibits a potent, deleterious impact on legitimacy. Results from a survey experiment support our posited mechanism. Pew Research Center, March Due to growing public understanding that legal expertise does not award the Court with determinate answers, the Court has partly lost expertise as a source of legitimacy.
On the other hand, as a result of the invention of scientific public opinion polls and their current centrality in the public mind, the Court has now available a new source of legitimacy. Thanks to public opinion polls that measure public support for the Court, the Court for the first time in its history, has now an independent and public metric demonstrating its public support. The monopoly elected institutions had on claiming to hold public mandate has been broken.
American Journal of Political Science, October Does public opinion directly influence decisions or do justices simply respond to the same social forces that simultaneously shape the public mood?
The results suggest that the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions is real, substantively important, and most pronounced in nonsalient cases. Public Opinion Quarterly, September National survey data show that large segments of the public perceive of the Court in political terms and prefer that justices be chosen on political and ideological bases. Empirical evidence refutes the backlash hypothesis and supports the political reinforcement hypothesis; the more individuals perceive the Court in politicized terms, the greater their preferences for a political appointment process.
Those who view the Court as highly politicized do not differentiate the Court from the explicitly political branches and therefore prefer that justices be chosen on political and ideological grounds. The Journal of Politics, However, the theory of competing public agency embraced by the Constitution suggests that public support for courts cannot, by itself, explain congressional support for judicial authority.
Instead, the logic of the separation of powers system indicates that legislative support for the institutional capacity of courts will be a function of public confidence in the legislature as well as evaluations of the judiciary.
The results offer a more refined and complex view of the role of public sentiment in balancing institutional power in American politics.
However, conflicting theoretical and empirical findings have given rise to a significant discrepancy in the scholarship.
Building on evidence from interviews with Supreme Court justices and former law clerks, I develop a formal model of judicial-congressional relations that incorporates judicial preferences for institutional legitimacy and the role of public opinion in congressional hostility towards the Supreme Court. The evidence indicates that public discontent with the Court, as mediated through congressional hostility, creates an incentive for the Court to exercise self-restraint.
When Congress is hostile, the Court uses judicial review to invalidate Acts of Congress less frequently than when Congress is not hostile towards the Court. Journal of Politics, AprilVol. Recent research indicates that, in addition to this indirect effect, Supreme Court justices respond directly to changes in public opinion. We explore the two causal pathways suggested to link public opinion directly to the behavior of justices and the implications of the nature and strength of these linkages for current debates concerning Supreme Court tenure.
The recent increase in the stability of Court membership has raised questions about the continued efficacy of the replacement mechanism and renewed debates over mechanisms to limit judicial tenure. Our analysis offers preliminary evidence that — even in the absence of membership change — public opinion may provide a mechanism by which the preferences of the Court can be aligned with those of the public. However, we argue that judicial preferences vary considerably across areas of the law, and that limitations in our ability to measure those preferences have constrained the set of questions scholars pursue.
Supreme Court and Public Opinion - Oxford Handbooks
We introduce a new approach, which makes use of information about substantive similarity among cases, to estimate judicial preferences that vary across substantive legal issues and over time.
In this article, I evaluate an often mentioned, yet untested theory of Supreme Court constraint: I argue the Court is constrained, at least in part, because the justices fear nonimplementation of their decisions. Accordingly, the effect of external pressure is strongest when the threat of nonimplementation is most severe. When the justices can confidently assume implementation of their decisions, they are less constrained by external forces.
The Court is especially successful at altering behavior when it issues rulings related to criminal law, civil liability, or judicial administration, regardless of public opinion.
Of course, lower-court compliance is not perfect ; judges sometimes exercise considerable discretion when making decisions. Consequently, the implementation of Court rulings in lateral cases depends on the popularity of those rulings, whereas the implementation of rulings in vertical cases does not.
The Supreme Court, public opinion and decision-making: Research roundup
This differential power dynamic creates an avenue for evaluating whether the fear of nonimplementation drives judicial constraint. If the Court is at least partly constrained by a fear of nonimplementation, then the degree to which it is constrained should depend on its implementation power.
Therefore, external constraint should be most prominent in important lateral cases because those are the cases in which implementation depends on public support. I test my theory of a semiconstrained Court in two separate analyses.
First, I evaluate the influence of public opinion and elite preferences on the ideological outcome of Supreme Court decisions. Each of these analyses confirms that external pressures exert stronger influence when nonimplementation is a concern. Consequently, these external forces exert differential effects in different issue contexts.
When the Court considers unimportant cases, the chance of strong public opposition is low; therefore, nonimplementation is unlikely and the justices can disregard external pressure.