The relationship between General Ulysses S. Grant and General William T. Sherman has been said to be . help to demonstrate why these two generals were able to find the .. Burne, Alfred H. Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership. By the end of the Civil War, most Americans considered either Robert E. Lee or Ulysses S. Grant to be a hero. The reputations of these two. But the escape of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia back . If Meade had expected Grant's support, he learned otherwise.
A cold rain fell on the winter camps of Army of the Potomac on March 10, During the day, a special train from Washington, D. Meade welcomed his former Mexican War comrade, whom he had not seen in years. Befitting the two men, their private conversation was cordial and frank. But merit alone did not clinch his promotion. President Abraham Lincoln endorsed the appointment only after receiving assurances that the hero of Fort Donelson and Vicksburg had no presidential ambitions for the election.
Congress reestablished the rank of lieutenant general, and Grant officially received his commission at a White House ceremony on March 9. Meade had commanded the Army of the Potomac for fewer than nine months. He had been with the army nearly from its inception, rising from brigade to division to corps command until his appointment as army commander a few days before Gettysburg. Meade had kept silent publicly as controversies, political machinations and strategy conflicts engulfed the army and his predecessors—George B.
Toiling in the Shadows: The Grant-Meade Command Relationship | HistoryNet
His fellow corps commanders had endorsed his promotion to command, and he justified that faith by leading them to a dramatic victory at Gettysburg. But the escape of General Robert E. After Gettysburg, operations in Virginia remained relatively quiet. Lincoln retained Meade despite his inactivity and mounting political pressure to remove the cautious general. A few months later, however, Grant came East. Upon his appointment, Grant originally had planned to remain in the West.
Now, he indicated to Meade, he would maintain his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. He had changed his mind after arriving in Washington and seeing for himself the political interference that had plagued the army since its formation. Then there was the inherent conflict that lay at its heart: As Meade had noted in the letter to his wife, Grant possessed a great tenacity of purpose.
He was a relentless opponent, a man who understood and accepted that fighting meant killing. Get at him as soon as you can.
Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep on moving. Grant did not seek a campaign marked by one successive bloody battle after another.
He preferred to defeat a foe by maneuver, but if the ensuing operations led to fearful bloodshed, so be it. Regardless of the costs or reversals, Grant made it clear there would be no turning back. That burden, imposed by the Lincoln administration and entangled with politics, required the army to follow a defensive strategy that began on July 25,with the appointment of George McClellan to command.
The safety of Washington would continually hamper McClellan and his successors while planning and conducting campaigns. They would conduct operations for limited results, lacking the strategic vision to see beyond the battle at hand. That approach had crippled the army in the past and would continue to do so unless it adopted a different strategic direction.
Consequently, as Grant and Meade readied the army for the spring campaign, the two men held disparate views on the path it should follow. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. Grant intended for the army to clear the Wilderness that first day, but he allowed Meade to halt the march in the forbidding terrain near Chancellorsville.
That proved to be an unwise decision by Meade. The Confederates struck the Union columns the next day, before they had passed through the heavily forested area— which the numerically inferior Rebels were able to use to their advantage in a fierce but inconclusive engagement.
That night the general-in-chief began to bend the army to his will. He ordered an offensive along the entire Union line for the next morning, May 6, though he delegated the tactical details to Meade and the corps commanders. A Confederate counterattack stopped the Union onslaught and shoved the Yankees rearward.
More Rebel charges followed, resulting in fearful slaughter. The Federal ranks held, and darkness ended the fury.
The opponents had suffered combined casualties of more than 28, The corps commanders in particular, Maj. Here are seven negotiation pointers you can glean from those letters: Make an aggressive opening gambit. The opening terms can anchor the negotiation--setting the baseline for acceptable terms.
10 fascinating facts about Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant - National Constitution Center
Of course, the risk is setting a baseline so preposterous you alienate your counterpart. So the key is anchoring your opening in the reality of common ground. What this requires is knowledge of what your counterpart will accept. So he opened negotiations by plainly asking Lee--commander of the Army of Northern Virginia--for his surrender: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle.The Real Brad Lea Returns to Confessions of An Entrepreneur with Grant Cardone
I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the C. Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. Keep it brief and direct. Observe how Grant comes right to the point. His letter is two sentences long. Don't say yes to the first offer. With brevity and directness matching Grant's, Lee essentially said, No, thank you--but tell me more: I have received your note of this date.
Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.
Lee illustrated another principle of effective negotiations: Deny the first offer, since the offerer is just trying to anchor terms.
Emphasize the common ground.
In this case, the common ground was avoiding the "useless effusion of blood. Grant returns to the common ground as he replies to Lee with terms: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received.
In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.
Once you find common ground, it can serve as a baseline from which both parties can proceed to the difficult parts of the negotiation. Sports agent Molly Fletcher told Inc. Agree to speak in real time and to meet in person. Note how Grant concludes his reply by offering to meet at a location of Lee's choice.
You can find all sorts of evidence--statistical and anecdotal--for how real-time communication abets negotiations. For example, as Inc.