United Arab Emirates–United States relations - Wikipedia
In the years after the September 11, attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, Yemen became a key site for U.S. intelligence gathering and drone. The United States continues to tacitly support Saudi Arabia and the United the UAE to target al-Qaida and Islamic State fighters in Yemen and the also For the Trump administration, the Saudi relationship is particularly. Analysis: Saudi Arabia and the UAE may be coalition partners providing military Council (STC) which seeks an independent South Yemen state. "Relations between the two could deteriorate in the future, but I doubt this.
Another of Aden's challenges is the replacement or updating of the port's antiquated infrastructure and equipment, very little of which has been modernized since the British withdrew in Compounding the situation are innumerable complex claims to the land surrounding the port. These claims were filed by Aden is who insist on the return of property that was confiscated by the former socialist regime.
The land in dispute encompasses an area that planners envisage transforming into an industrial free-trade zone. Time, Law and Venture Capital The solution to these constraints requires time, adequate legal redress for the litigants and considerable investment. All of these are dependent upon a combination of variables, chief among which are sustained political stability and success in implementing free-market, privatization and related economic reforms.
Meanwhile, Adenis and other South Yemenis will likely remain central to Aden's port and to its future industrial operations. This continues to buttress the hopes of some that a separate South Yemen wi11 be created, once again showcasing Aden as its commercial center and political capital, but this time with two additional features - an industrial free-trade zone and a role as a regional hub for international container cargo.
This said, many who once favored this option - and they include those who lost their positions of power as far back as the transformation from colonial rule to national sovereignty in - effectively shelved their dream when Yemen's civil war ended in Even those who cling to the hope admit that this possibility, at least for the foreseeable future, has been marginalized. None of its proponents are in positions of power or have sufficient influence, either by themselves or in association with outside powers, to make it a reality.
The quest to develop Aden's economic and commercial potential, however, remains a key factor in Yemen's hope of being able to solve its border dispute with Saudi Arabia in the near future. In addition, wealthy Saudi Arabians of Yemeni ancestry- for example, the Bin Mahfouz Group, owners of the National Commercial Bank, the kingdom's largest - have a substantial stake in Aden's development prospects, having committed, in the mid-l s, more than a quarter of a billion dollars in investment.
An analysis of this perspective reveals the following: The Minuses Throughout not only the era of British imperialism in south Arabia but also the period of independence sincethe Hadramaut and Mahra have been part of a larger governmental entity. In this century, they have never been independent. In contrast to what used to be North Yemen and the western part of what was South Yemen - specifically Aden, the capital - their people lack skills and first-hand experience in diplomacy and national defense; Moreover, unlike Aden and South Yemen, the Hadramaut and Mahra have no record of modern industry.
Their people inhabit a subsistence-level farming and fishing region. Despite recent oil production in the Hadramaut, there is no refinery or energy industry; While a breakaway South Yemen and any combined or separate effort to sever the country's easternmost parts are definitely opposed by Sanaa, it is not known whether a successful breakaway south, with its would-be capital presumably in Aden, would support or oppose a breaking away by the Hadramaut and Mahra to establish their own independent state.
The Pluses Hadramis are culturally distinct. In recent centuries, they have shared a broader and longer common history than their Yemeni fellow citizens in the western parts of the country; There are many wealthy Hadramis working in the GCC countries, some of whom might wish either to return to try to make even greater fortunes in a new East Yemen or give favorable consideration to becoming major investors in such a state; and The region has significant tourist potential, not only as a living archaeological museum, but also as a tourist destination with nearly a thousand miles of unspoiled beaches and islands.
This fourth possibility has caught the eye of private sector investors in some GCC countries. Quite a few are keen to bid on the potentially lucrative business opportunities that would likely follow any decision to build a pipeline, refinery or export terminal and related facilities in the region. More Minuses than Pluses Even were such schemes to succeed, the gains to Saudi Arabia and others that might accrue would likely be far outweighed by the disadvantages: Incurring region-wide condemnation for promoting the break-up of an Arab state; Generating an additional major foreign assistance responsibility; and Creating a potentially far-reaching precedent for other would-be breakaway movements in Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan and Turkey.
Yemen's Political System and Its Neighbors Many Yemenis believe that Saudi Arabia and other GCC states are disenchanted with Yemen's form of governance and the extent to which it has encouraged popular participation in the political process. In Sanaa, the official line is that Yemen's political situation is unique and not for export, that its antecedents predate unification in Mayand that since then the citizenry's sense of national unity has been strengthened.
At the unofficial level, many Yemenis find it difficult to resist boasting about their country's political achievements over the past decade. They express doubts that neighboring and other nearby countries could be pleased. Many Yemenis have indicated to this analyst that they think the GCC countries' leaders see key aspects of Yemen's political system as being at odds with their own.
They don't appreciate the degree of freedom of expression allowed, and they would like it to stop. Several high-ranking Saudi Arabian officials agree. They point to their next-door neighbor Kuwait, where, for over 40 years, experiments in expanding popular participation in the political process have taken place. Kuwait's history of press freedoms and parliamentary as well as student, cooperative and trade-union elections is considerably more advanced than what has occurred to date in unified Yemen.
The Absence of Alternatives The kinds of governmental structures that Yemen has had in the recent past have no counterparts in the Arab Middle East or the wider Islamic world. Forty years ago, Yemen consisted of one imamate, one sharifdom, one British Crown colony, one federation, two countries comprising the Yemen Arab Republic North Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen South Yementwo protectorates, four sultanates, and 17 shaikhdoms, states or emirates.
In addition, prior tothe same British Aden and South Yemen-related jurisdiction administered all of these governments except the imamate which was independent and based in Sanaaas well as islands in the Red Sea off North Yemen; in the Indian Ocean off South Yemen and East Africa; and far to the north and east in the area south of the Arabian Sea, off Oman. Most observers who have studied the alternatives find it remarkable that a single country could have emerged from so many disparate entities.
Indeed, among specialists there exists a national, regional and international consensus that it is difficult to imagine how either the unification of Yemen in May or the country's subsequent national development process could have occurred - or could be sustained - in any other way.
By what other form of government or political process could one envision an avowedly Marxist government - led by the South's Yemen Socialist party YSP merging with an ardently anti-communist regime North Yemen? And where else can one find a parallel to what happened afterwards?
The leaders of South Yemen's largely single-party socialist regime agreed with the General People's Congress, the party of many officials and leading personalities in the north, to share power with a third major party, Isiah. What is notable is that Isiah, by its nature and orientation religious, traditional and tribally baseddiffers in profound ways from both.
The fact that Yemen's Marxist YSP shared nearly equal political power with this Islamist party from to is without precedent in Arab and Islamic history. Yemen's dramatically varied sub regions and political history would have been far more volatile, even violent- in ways antithetical to the strategic interests and stability of Saudi Arabia and a great many other countries - had there been an attempt to exclude one or more of Yemen's major political forces, given the number of their respective supporters and substantial influence in various sectors of Yemeni national life.
Foreign relations of Yemen
Saudi Arabians and Yemenis with this perspective occupy positions that enable them to keep abreast of day-to-day as well as longer-term developments in their respective country's external relations.
They are dismayed at what they profess to be a lingering inability of their governments to seize the moment and do what is right for both countries, the surrounding region and the world at large. They claim to have had high hopes before for an imminent resolution of the issues outstanding between the two countries, only to have them dashed. This experience, coupled with their resentment at playing no more than a marginal role in disputes, has produced skepticism that lasting progress will be made.
These individuals doubt that the shortcomings of the central players are likely to be subordinated to an agreement that would be accepted by the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni governments and peoples.
High-ranking Yemenis bristle in reaction to this depiction, as they think Yemen has been sincere and forthcoming in its efforts to reach a settlement, only to be met with new demands. By contrast, Saudi Arabian officials are bothered by what they consider the condescending tone of such a perspective. Their typical response has been to take exception to the perceived sense of urgency that many Yemenis impute to such "strategically important and highly complex issues.
Some among them suggest that, for now, it ought to be enough to reach an agreement on the border. Achieving a breakthrough on this issue should provide the necessary framework to deal with many other matters, such as trade and the number of Yemenis permitted to work in Saudi Arabia. Critics on both sides agree it is difficult to envision the indefinite prolongation of a situation that, beyond endangering the region's stability and security, is of questionable benefit to the strategic interests of either side, not to mention the interests of their friends and would-be working partners, especially foreign investors.
Some Yemenis, as noted, believe that Saudi Arabia opposes any significant increase in defense cooperation between Sanaa and Washington. Behind their concern is an awareness that Yemen, despite not having been part of the coalition that liberated Kuwait inhas increasingly shown a willingness to cooperate on defense issues with the United States.
Sanaa is already working closely with U. In the eyes of U. Analysts differ on the merits of such a strategy. However, many Saudi Arabian, Yemeni and American strategists agree that their mutual goal is deterrence of would-be challengers to the existing order in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. Official Views and Popular Consensus It is doubtful that there may still be a high-level game plan in one or more of the GCC countries to punish Yemen for its stance during the Kuwait crisis, although high-ranking Yemenis continue to feel victimized for having failed to join the Allied Coalition in its reversal of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
A growing number of Kuwaitis point to the fact that their government gave its de facto endorsement of a prominent Kuwaiti delegation's one-week visit to Yemen in as a sign of Kuwait's eagerness to drive whatever wedges it can between Baghdad and its previous partners.
The purpose was to explore the possibility of forging cooperation between the two countries and renewing an appreciation of their common interests on a broad range of issues. Yemeni officials who hosted the delegation, however, acknowledge that the visit achieved little. More important, they stress, has been the improvement in official attitudes, sinceresulting from several September meetings in succession in New York between Kuwait's deputy prime minister and foreign minister and Yemen's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, in conjunction with the annual U.
Saudi Arabian-Yemeni Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy
Among the more pressing regional issues that lay behind these meetings, viewed from the perspective of military strategists in Kuwait and several other GCC countries, is a desire to see Yemen become part of a broadened, U. They point out that, although Yemen's candidacy for admission to the GCC is not under active consideration, Yemen's lack of membership does not preclude the development of a GCC-Yemen defense agreement of informal understanding of some kind.
Yemen, from its side, is predisposed to join Kuwait and other GCC states to enhance the prospects for its reintegration into the geopolitical nexus of Arab countries that joined the allied coalition. Sanaa, moreover, is also aware that, unless it is able to restore its close relationship with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it has little hope of an imminent resumption of these countries' previous support, directly or via regional funds, for Yemeni economic and social development projects.
In addition to these considerations, all the GCC countries' leaders recognize that Yemen's deep-water port in Aden is situated along strategically vital sea lanes. It was through these lanes, not the region's air corridors, that the overwhelming majority of heavy equipment essential to Kuwait's liberation was brought into the region.
In any future Gulf conflict, they are likely to remain vital. Geopolitics as a Constant For defense planners, of additional importance is the geopolitical role that Yemen could be expected to play in any regional conflict. In the Kuwait crisis, Sanaa's behavior fell far short of the expectations of the Allied Coalition and the five permanent members of the U. The League, on August 3 and 10,voted 12 to 9 on two historic Kuwait crisis resolutions.
The first condemned the Iraqi invasion unequivocally. The second called for the members to mobilize and deploy their armed forces to Saudi Arabia to prevent the invasion from spreading to other Arab countries. Yemen was one of nine countries that either voted against or abstained on both resolutions.
Yemen as Potential Balancer One of the twelve countries voting in favor of the resolutions was Somalia, a country that, because it has since imploded, might not vote the same way were a similar conflict to occur. It is also possible that, in a future conflict, Morocco might not be as forthcoming in support of the GCC countries as before. InMorocco, because it voted in favor of both resolutions, was convulsed with anti-Coalition demonstrations that, not surprisingly, emboldened Iraq.
Compounding the difficulty of predicting what a vote tally might be in response to an attack by Iraq, Iran or any other country is the fact that the League has acquired a new member in the interim: No one can say how Comoros would have voted had it been a member of the League when the Kuwait crisis erupted.
Neither can one with any certainty predict what its position or actions might be in response to an attack against a fellow League member. The outcome of future League votes in any conflict involving an Arab country is, therefore, far from certain. For example, the result could easily be a deadlocked League, with half its members voting in favor of cooperating to resist the threat and half opposed.
In such a situation, a Yemen that voted to mobilize and deploy forces to assist the victim of aggression - something it did not do the last time around - could tilt the balance. Deterrence and Defense Capabilities Senior defense officials, chiefs of staff and armed-forces commanders in Saudi Arabia and Yemen acknowledge their respective and joint interests in the promotion of regional peace and stability.
While the UAE says it continues to support the government and the mission of defeating the Houthis, some southern leaders are based in Abu Dhabi and their troops have been armed and funded by the UAE.
United States–Yemen relations - Wikipedia
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have presented their cultivation of different factions on the anti-Houthi side as a division of labor aimed at the same goal, but the contradictions of the policy have now become clear. Prime Minister Ahmed bin Daghr remains holed up in a fortified palace in Aden. Though Saudi and UAE troops protect him, armed southerners are posted near the gates in a reminder of the new realities on the ground. Some pro-government forces withdrew from southern battlefronts, where they had been facing the Houthis, and returned to Aden to help fight the separatists.
Slideshow 6 Images Houthi fighters meanwhile face discord within their own ranks and have lost some territory to government forces. Yemeni officials said the rebels were forcibly conscripting fighters and recruiting child soldiers. But it not clear that the coalition can push the Houthis out of Sanaa. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Yemen also received significant funding from the Middle East Partnership Initiative. Funds primarily supported literacy projects, election monitoring, training for civil society, and the improvement of electoral procedures.
In fiscal yearU. Section Authority is a Department of Defense account designed to provide equipment, supplies, or training to foreign national military forces engaged in counter-terrorist operations. Yemen became eligible to reapply in November and had its eligibility reinstated in Februarynearly six months after it held what some observers described as a relatively successful presidential election.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11,the Yemeni government became more forthcoming in its cooperation with the U. President Saleh reportedly has allowed small groups of U.
According to press articles quoting U.
Saudi Arabia and UAE suffer Yemen setback as allies fall out | Reuters
According to the U. Current law as applied to counterterrorism was weak. Article 44 of the constitution states that a Yemeni national may not be extradited to a foreign authority.